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INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
SUPERFUND CLAIMS: ARE RESPONSE
COSTS RECOVERABLE DAMAGES?
NANCY W. MONTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the costs of remediating uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal
sites soar, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act1
(CERCLA or Superfund) are looking increasingly to their insurance
carriers, past and present, to help finance both the site cleanup and the
associated legal defense costs. Insurers, however, typically deny cover-
age as well as any duty to defend. The result has been extensive litiga-
tion between insurers and their insureds regarding the scope of liability
coverage under comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance
policies.
The issues in Superfund insurance cases are complicated by argua-
bly ambiguous insurance policy language, the typical delayed manifes-
tation of the claim, and the need to regularly consult state insurance
law. Several federal courts have faced these coverage issues, but with
differing results. Attorneys practicing in South Carolina should be
aware that the Fourth Circuit has held in favor of the insurer in every
published action to date. This Article will analyze rulings in the Fourth
Circuit and contrast these decisions with the reasoning utilized by
other courts.
Prior to discussing the case law, it may be beneficial to briefly re-
view some common insurance policy language upon which most
Superfund insurance claims are based and to briefly outline CERCLA
requirements. Although standard language and definitions have varied
over the years, the following provision is typical of most CGL policies:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
Coverage A. bodily injury or
Coverage B. property damage
* Associate, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak and Stewart, Greenville, South Caro-
lina. Ms. Monts concentrates her practice on environmental issues. B.S., Biology, Univer-
sity of South Carolina, 1984; J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 1987.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage .... 2
"Occurrence" typically is defined as "'an accident, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bod-
ily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.' "-3 "'Property damage' means injury to or
destruction of tangible property.' 4 The majority of Superfund insur-
ance cases focus on these provisions, questioning whether response
costs are considered "damages" under the policy and whether leakage
from a hazardous waste site constitutes an "occurrence" within the
policy's coverage." A growing number of cases address the applicability
of pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies.' Exclusion clauses, how-
ever, typically are consulted only if the policy otherwise would cover
the loss. Because the Fourth Circuit bases its determination of cover-
age on the initial applicability of the policy to response costs,7 thereby
eliminating the need to consider these provisions, pollution exclusion
clauses are not included in this discussion.
The vast number of PRPs under Superfund has contributed to the
extensive insurance litigation before the courts. CERCLA includes, as
potentially responsible for uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, anyone
owning property or operating a facility where hazardous substances are
located, anyone arranging for disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances at the facility, or anyone generating the waste.' The statute
2. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986) (giving
CGL language and definitions for 1969 policy); see also Waste Management, Inc. v. Peer-
less Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (giving similar language in insurance
policies from 1974 to 1980).
3. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327 (quoting 1969 Canadian Universal liability policy).
4. Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 397 (D.N.J.
1987)(quoting definition from defendant's insurance contract).
5. See, e.g., Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327-29.
6. See, e.g., FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214, 217-18 (6th
Cir. 1990); Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 402
N.W.2d 46 (1986).
7. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328-29.
8. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The actual text
reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section--
(1)the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2)any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3)any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
[Vol. 41
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subjects responsible parties to liability for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a state not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.'
The state or federal government can exercise its authority to re-
cover response costs even if the injury, or threat of injury, to the envi-
ronment is confined to the responsible party's property. Furthermore,
the government has the option of conducting the remedial activity it-
self and suing for reimbursement, or seeking equitable relief in the
form of an injunction ordering the responsible parties to remedy the
damage. This option, in addition to the government's ability to sue for
either response costs, damages for injury to natural resources, or both,
is particularly important in many of the Superfund insurance cases de-
nying coverage.
II. FOURTH CIRCUIT CASES
One of the earliest cases dealing with insurance coverage under
Superfund is Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co.10 Mraz arose
from the related case of United States v. Bissell,1 in which the United
States and the state of Maryland sued Paul and Sally Mraz, among
others, for costs incurred by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for remedial activity at the Leslie hazardous waste site. The
Mrazs operated Galaxy, a solvent recycling corporation. In August of
1969, Galaxy had arranged for several hundred barrels of chemical
waste to be removed from the facility and buried at the Leslie site. The
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4)any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable ....
Id.
9. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
10. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
11. Civ. No. Y-83-3745 (D. Md.) (cited in Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326).
1990]
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Mrazs contended that their prior insurance carrier, Canadian Universal
Insurance Co. (Canadian Universal), was obligated to defend and in-
demnify them in the Bissell litigation pursuant to policies in effect
from 1966 until December 31, 1969. Because the EPA's investigation of
and remedial activity at the site did not occur until the early 1980s,
Canadian Universal argued that no "occurrence" within the meaning of
the insurance policy existed. Canadian Universal also claimed that re-
sponse costs did not constitute "property damage" under the policy.12
The Canadian Universal policy defined property damage as "'in-
jury to or destruction of tangible property.' "13 The court noted that
facts to this effect were alleged in the complaint, but emphasized that
under the policy, a release resulting in property damage could not be
an occurrence unless damage resulted during the policy period.14 The
initial inquiry therefore focused on determining which event triggers
liability in a hazardous waste disposal case: disposal or discovery.
15
"The general rule is that '[t]he time of the occurrence of an acci-
dent within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the
wrongful act was committed but the time when the complaining party
was actually damaged.' "16 In many cases, however, the existence or
scope of damage can remain concealed for an extended period of time,
rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely when the
damage occurred. In these situations, "the better rule is that the occur-
rence is deemed to take place when the injuries first manifest them-
selves."1 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that in hazardous waste
burial cases, "the occurrence is judged by the time at which the leakage
12. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327-28.
13. Id. at 1327.
14. Id. The policy period in question was January 1, 1969 through January 1, 1970.
Id. Not all CGL policies contain this limitation in the definition of occurrence.
15. See id. at 1327-28. The court in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064,
1070 (D. Idaho 1986), studied and cited several opinions addressing a similar trigger of
liability issue in asbestos "cases. Three theories have developed in those cases: manifesta-
tion, exposure, or a combination of the two known as multiple trigger of continuous ex-
posure. The manifestation theory identifies the responsible insurer as the one whose pol-
icy is in effect at the time the injury manifests itself. The exposure theory assigns
liability under the policy in effect at the time of the initial exposure to the harm. The
multiple trigger theory includes, as potentially responsible, all insurers with policies in
effect from the time of the initial exposure until manifestation. Id. (citing Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1028
(1983) (manifestation); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Installations, 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (exposure); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (multiple trigger); AC&S, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985) (exposure)).
16. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American
Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1, 7, 345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1976)).
17. Id.
[Vol. 41
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and damage are first discovered.""' Because nothing in the complaint
indicated that a release from the Leslie site was discovered prior to
1981, eleven years after the final Canadian Universal policy coverage
period expired, the court found there was no occurrence.1" Conse-
quently, Canadian Universal was under no obligation to defend or in-
demnify the Mrazs in the Bissell litigation.
While the Fourth Circuit could have based its opinion solely on
the rationale that the "occurrence" was outside of the policy period,
the court also addressed Canadian Universal's alternative argument:
even if the loss was caused by an occurrence, no duty to defend existed
because the plaintiffs did not allege property damage.20 The court con-
cluded that response costs are an economic loss, not an injury to or
destruction of real property.2 ' Explaining its decision, the court stated:
The district court observed that the Bissell complaint alleged that the
release caused contamination of soil and water resulting in the need
for the cleanup and therefore concluded that the complaint alleged
property damage. The problem is that the court failed to consider
whether the alleged contamination of the Leslie site was the injury for
which the governments sought relief or merely a factual predicate of
the cost reimbursement claim....
.... The allegations of property damage set forth the basis for
the governments' response costs, and do not constitute part of the
governments' request for relief.
2
The court thus concluded that no property damage existed within the
meaning of the policy.
In 1987, the Fourth Circuit struck another blow to insureds within
its jurisdiction. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,23 the court
held that response costs do not constitute a claim for "damages" under
a CGL policy. As stated earlier, CGL policies typically provide cover-
age for any sums which the insured legally is obligated to pay as dam-
.18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id. The Fourth Circuit was, at least theoretically, applying Maryland law to this
diversity action. In South Carolina, however, a different result may have been mandated.
At least one South Carolina decision has implied that the "exposure" theory is followed
in this state. See Boggs v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565
(1979). Boggs involved a contractor's negligent siting of a house which ultimately led to
damage from water seepage. The court concluded that the contractor's negligent place-
ment of the house caused the house to be exposed to water seepage and the resulting
property damage constituted an occurrence. Id. at 463; 252 S.E.2d at 567.
20. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328.
21. Id. at 1329.
22. Id. at 1328-29 (citation omitted).
23. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
1990]
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ages. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that response costs under
Superfund are a form of equitable relief in the nature of restitution,
and that as such they cannot be considered damages within the policy
coverage.
24
Most states hold that the terms of an insurance policy are to be
construed according to the meaning a reasonably prudent layman
would infer .2 This rule is tempered, however, since some courts narrow
the scope of the term "damages" by adopting a narrow, technical defi-
nition which includes only payments to third parties with a legal claim
for damages, thus excluding claims for injunctive or restitutionary re-
lief. The Fourth Circuit in Armco relied upon this Maryland limitation,
and noted that "[d]amages is [sic] a form of substantial redress which
seeks to replace the loss in value with a sum of money. Restitution,
conversely, is designed to reimburse a party for restoring the status
quo."2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that without this interpretation,
the term, as used in the policy provision "obligated to pay as dam-
ages," would become surplusage, because all obligations to pay would
be covered.27 The court rejected all of Armco's arguments to the
contrary.
28
Armco initially argued that no distinction should be drawn in
Superfund cases between actions seeking compensation for injury or
loss (e.g., a CERCLA section 107 action for damage to natural re-
sources) and actions to recover response costs or to force a responsible
party cleanup. Armco contended that recognizing the distinction would
result in the liability of the insurer being determined by the "merely
fortuitous" event that the government chose to remediate the contami-
nated site itself and then sue to recover costs, rather than sue directly
for damage to the property.29 Armco reasoned that an insurer's liability
on its policy should not rest on the procedural decisions of a third
party. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting that the measure of dam-
ages to natural resources was not necessarily equivalent to the cost of
restoring the area: "It might very well cost far more to restore [dam-
aged property] than it would to pay damages for its loss."" °
The Fourth Circuit viewed investigative and remedial action taken
or required by the government in response to adverse environmental
24. Id. at 1350.
25. Id. at 1352 (citing Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casaulty Co., 302 Md.
383, 488 A.2d 486 (1985)).
26. Id. at 1353.
27. Id. at 1352.
28. Id. at 1352-53.
29. Id. (citing United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336
N.W.2d 838 (1983)).
30. Id. at 1353.
[Vol. 41
6
South Carolina Law Revie , Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/9
9INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR SUPERFUND
conditions as harm-avoidance measures, and noted in Armco that
courts would establish a dangerous precedent if they construed insur-
ance policies as encompassing costs of compliance with "injury preven-
tion measures." 31 The court explained:
Maryland Casualty has contracted with Armco to reimburse only
where Armco is obligated to pay damages which result from injury,
which in the insurance context means damages in the legal sense. In
the absence of clear contract language or specific Congressional au-
thorization in CERCLA, we decline to extend the obligations of insur-
ance carriers beyond the well-illumined area of tangible injury and
into the murky and boundless realm of injury prevention. We hold
that the costs to Armco of complying with the directives of a regula-
tory agency are not covered within the terms of the insurance policy.2
The Court, however, failed to cite any cases supporting its position
that remedial activity is a prophylactic measure not covered by CGL
insurance policies.
The Armco and Mraz opinions purportedly were based on Mary-
land law. In deciding similar questions under South Carolina law, the
Fourth Circuit in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Milliken & Co. 33 "per-
ceive[d] no material distinctions between the South Carolina and Ma-
ryland laws in the construction and interpretation of insurance policies
that should cause [it] to deviate from Armco and Mraz."3" Accordingly,
the court held that under South Carolina law, "damages" in the insur-
ance context means legal damages and does not include response costs
which are claims for equitable relief."5
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California
in Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.36 criticized the
Fourth Circuit for failing to actually apply Maryland law in Mraz and
Armco.37 As pointed out in Intel, the defendants in Mraz were before
the Fourth Circuit on diversity of citizenship and therefore the law of
the forum state should have been applied.38 A brief review of the Mraz
31. Id. at 1353-54. The court viewed the EPA's intervention at the disposal site as
preventive in nature, claiming that the case presented no instance of actual harm to
human or animal life. Even if there had been some injury, the court indicated it would
still view the government's involvement as preventive in nature. The court, however, did
not discuss why contamination of the soil and possible groundwater contamination at the
site did not constitute actual damage to the property.
32. Id. at 1354.
33. 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988).
34. Id. at 980-81.
35. Id. at 981.
36. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
37. Id. at 1186-87.
38. Id. (citing Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938)).
1990]
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opinion reveals that no Maryland cases were even cited and no expla-
nation was given for their absence. Instead, the court based its analysis
of the terms "property damage" and "occurrence" on CERCLA, a fed-
eral statute, and non-Maryland case law. Furthermore, the court sum-
marily dismissed response costs as "economic loss" without citing any
Maryland precedent. This classification did not necessarily resolve the
issue of whether response costs are a loss compensable as "damages"
under the insurance policy. Some states, for instance, recognize that
economic losses may constitute property damage. 9
Similarly, a close review of the Armco decision reveals only limited
application of Maryland law in that diversity case. The Fourth Circuit
cited one Maryland opinion as precedent that "black-letter law [re-
quires] that the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed ac-
cording to the meaning a reasonably prudent layman would infer.
'40
The court, however, failed to apply the rule of that case, claiming that
Maryland had adopted a more narrow definition of damages, to include
only legal damages and not injunctive or restitutionary relief.41 The
cases cited by the court, however, are from federal and New Hamp-
shire courts. 42 If Maryland precedent for this proposition existed, the
Fourth Circuit failed to include it in the Armco opinion.43
It is similarly questionable whether the brief Milliken opinion
properly summarized and applied South Carolina law. In a recent case,
Braswell v. Faircloth," the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a government mandated cleanup of a chemical spill constituted prop-
erty damage within the meaning of the CGL insurance policy.
Pepper Industries leased property from Braswell Shipyards and
later from Neckland Associates to use in its business of cleaning com-
mercial fuel oil tanks and boilers. Pepper Industries maintained a gen-
eral liability insurance policy with United States Fidelity and Guar-
39. See, e.g., Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co, 270 S.C. 499, 503, 243 S.E.2d 831, 832
(1978) (consequential loss of profits suffered when tobacco picking machine failed to
function properly and crop could not be harvested constituted property damage).
40. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
42. See id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir.
1955); Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977);
Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 106 A.2d 196 (1954)).
43. Since Armco was decided, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Maryland Cup
Corp. v. Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 81 Md. App. 518, 568 A.2d 1129
(1990), directly addressed the definition of damages in a non-CERCLA context. The
court recognized that the issue had not been decided previously by Maryland state
courts. See id. at 523, 568 A.2d at 1129. The court then proceeded to adapt the Armco
definition to its purpose. See id.
44. - S.C. -, 387 S.E.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 41
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anty (USF&G). The policy was in effect from February 1980 through
February 1984. Neckland Associates terminated Pepper Industries'
lease in March of 1983 after it became evident that the company had
abandoned the property. In May of that year, corrosive chemicals left
by Pepper Industries on the leased premises ate through a valve on one
of the storage tanks and 1000 gallons of the stored material spilled
onto the ground.
45
After Pepper Industries failed to remedy the spill, the South Caro-
lina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) and
the EPA ordered Neckland Associates to perform the necessary re-
sponse work and remove the remaining waste stored at the site. Neck-
land Associates completed the remedial action. Subsequently, Neck-
land was awarded more than $180,000 in damages against Pepper
Industries in a lawsuit brought in federal court. Elliott Braswell, a
partner in Neckland Associates, brought the state action seeking a de-
claratory judgment that USF&G's CGL policy covered the damages.4
The trial court held the damages claimed by Braswell did not con-
stitute "property damage" within the meaning of the insurance pol-
icy.47 The court, viewing the claim against Pepper Industries as one for
restitution since the claimant attempted to restore the status quo, re-
lied upon Armco to deny coverage.48 The court of appeals reversed in
part, holding that the chemical spill did cause "property damage. 49
Thus, the cleanup portion of the federal court judgment 0 was covered
under the policy.51 While the court of appeals impliedly refuted the
Milliken interpretation of South Carolina law on this matter, the court
failed to discuss why these response costs were considered "damages"
under the insurance contract.
The court of appeals only briefly discussed Armco and Milliken,
and cited those cases as authority for holding that the costs of removal
of stored waste were not covered by the policy. The court noted that
the stored chemicals, which were not leaking, had not yet caused phys-
ical injury to property. 2 The money expended for removal of these
materials, therefore, was preventive in nature and did not constitute a
sum Pepper Industries was legally obligated to pay as damages for
45. Id. at -, 387 S.E.2d at 708.
46. Id.
47. Id. at -, 387 S.E.2d at 710.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. The damage award included $6,643.72 for cleanup costs. Id. at ., 387 S.E.2d at
711.
51. Id. at , 387 S.E.2d at 710.
52. Id. at -, 387 S.E.2d at 709.
1990]
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physical injury to or destruction of tangible property."' Accordingly,
these costs from the federal court judgment were not covered by the
USF&G policy, although the actual cleanup costs were covered.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Mraz, Armco, and Milliken demonstrate the Fourth Circuit's posi-
tion that CGL insurance policies do not cover the costs of responding
to uncontrolled hazardous wastes sites. Other jurisdictions are split
with regard to coverage for these CERCLA expenses. Massachusetts,
for example, classifies cleanup costs as "property damages" within the
coverage of CGL policies.5 4 The Eighth Circuit believes Missouri law
excludes response costs from coverage as damages under CGL poli-
cies, 5 but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania disagrees."6 Additionally, California federal and state
courts are split on the issue.5
Courts addressing Superfund insurance issues are basically in
agreement that the cases are to be decided under applicable state law.
Furthermore, a review of the opinions indicates that most state insur-
ance law requires ambiguities or doubts in coverage to be construed
against the insurer and policy terms to be given their plain, ordinary
meaning. Courts within various jurisdictions, however, are applying
these rules of construction and reaching different results on the issue
of coverage.58
Some of the most instructive criticism of the Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning can be found in the dissent of an opinion actually adopting the
53. Id.
54. See Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20364 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1989).
55. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 842
F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
56. Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1606, 1614
(E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) ("[B]ecause 'under Missouri law the rules of construction appli-
cable to insurance contracts require that the language used be given its plain meaning,'
and because I am unable to discern any basis for the [Northeastern Pharmaceutical]
majority's decision under existing Missouri caselaw, I conclude that under Missouri law,
the term 'damages' in the standard-form general comprehensive liability policy includes
cleanup costs." (citation omitted)), modified, No. 88-5723 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1989)
(WESTLAW, DCTU database) (modified to exclude expenses dealing solely with in-
sured's own property).
57. Compare Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171
(N.D. Cal. 1938) (cleanup of contamination constitutes damages within the terms of the
CGL policy) with AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1989) (response costs are equitable in nature and are not "damages" anticipated
under CGL policies), review granted, 264 Cal. Rptr. 354, 782 P.2d 595 (1989).
58. See infra notes 59-100 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41
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Fourth Circuit rationale. In Continental Insurance Cos. v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.59 (NEPACCO), a closely divided
court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and held that "dam-
ages" in the standard form CGL policy excludes cleanup costs. 0 The
court noted, however, that environmental contamination caused by the
disposal of hazardous substances can constitute "property damage."61
NEPACCO was decided under Missouri law, which holds that
"rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts require that
the language used be given its plain meaning. If the language is unam-
biguous the policy must be enforced according to such language. If the
language is ambiguous it will be construed against the insurer. Lan-
guage is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions;
and language used will be viewed in light of 'the meaning that would
ordinarily be understood by the lay [person] who bought and paid for
the policy.' "62
Obviously, the lay insured expects the term "damages" to include
all monetary claims, whether described as damages, expenses, costs, or
losses. The term, therefore, is ambiguous." The NEPACCO court,
however, draws a distinction if the term is used within the context of
insurance. "[T]he term 'damages' is not ambiguous [in the insurance
context], and the plain meaning of the term 'damages' as used in the
insurance context refers to legal damages and does not include equita-
ble monetary relief. '64 No Missouri cases are cited for this proposition.
Instead, the Eighth Circuit relies heavily on Armco which, at least the-
oretically, applied Maryland law. 5
It is difficult to comprehend how "damages" looses its ambiguity
with respect to the average lay person when the word appears in an
insurance policy. After all, the rules of construction for insurance poli-
cies are designed to protect an insured. The Eighth Circuit attempted
to rationalize the limited construction of "damages," apparently by
analogy, claiming such an interpretation is consistent with: (1) the in-
59. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988).
60. Id. at 987.
61. Cf. Mraz (governmental claims for remediation costs are not claims for damages
due to "property damage").
62. Id. at 985 (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698
(Mo. 1982) (en banc)).
63. See id. at 988 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see also Avondale Indus. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (cleanup costs recoverable as damages
because the average businessman would consider himself covered for those expenses),
aff'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1576 (April 10, 1990).
64. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822
F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)).
65. See Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354.
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surer's obligations under the policy as a whole; (2) the distinction
drawn in insurance law between money damages and equitable relief;
and (3) the statutory scheme of CERCLA. 6
According to the court, NEPACCO's policy did not cover "'all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay.' "67 Con-
tinental, the insurer, only obligated itself to pay the sums NEPACCO
was obligated to pay as damages.68 Borrowing once again from Armco,
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that permitting recovery for anything but
monetary legal damages would render the "as damages" provision in
the policy mere surplusage, since any obligation to pay would be
covered. 9
The court next pointed out that insurance coverage typically is not
recognized for the costs of complying with an injunction even though
the suit could have been brought for damages."0 The court, however,
cited no Missouri cases for that proposition.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit noted that CERCLA differentiates be-
tween cleanup costs and damages.7 1 The court noted that "[u]nder
CERCLA cleanup costs are not substantially equivalent to compensa-
tory damages for injury to or destruction of the environment." 72 The
court then claimed several cases have "overlooked" this distinction.73
Nothing in the court's opinion, however, indicates whether this distinc-
tion actually was overlooked, or was considered and discarded as form
over substance.74 Somewhat surprisingly, NEPACCO cited Jack L.
Baker Cos. v. Pasley Manufacturing & Distributing Co.75 to support
66. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
67. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id; see also CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (detailing relief available under Superfund).
72. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
73. Id.
74. NEPACCO references United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich.
App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983). See id. The Aviex court determined that the distinc-
tion between recovery for response costs and recovery of damages for damage to nature
resources was "'merely fortuitous from the standpoint of either [the insured] or [the
insurer].'" NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986 (quoting Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 590, 336
N.W.2d at 843). The court reasoned that in either case, the measure of monetary relief
granted is measured by the cost to restore the environment to its original state. Aviex
rejected the argument that the term "damages" should be limited so as not to include
equitable costs. Id. (citing Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843). NEPACCO
failed to discuss why this distinction existed. If the course was relying upon the legal
damages/equitable relief distinction, its reasoning is somewhat circular.
75. 413 S.W.2d 268, 273-74 (Mo. 1967).
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its position. Baker is a Missouri case which held that the measure of
damages to real property is the lesser of the following: (1) the differ-
ence in value before and after injury, or (2) the cost of restoring the
land to its original condition.7 7 Thus, under Baker a plaintiff can re-
cover, as damages, the cost of restoring real property to its predamaged
condition. 8 The court failed to explain why CERCLA "restoration
costs" should be treated differently.
One final jurisdiction merits some discussion. Courts in California
are sharply divided on the issue of insurance coverage of Superfund
response costs. As discussed previously, the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California in Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co.79 rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis, claiming that
the Fourth Circuit failed to apply state law as required in federal di-
versity cases.8 0 The Intel court concluded California law would recog-
nize that response costs represent damage incurred for which compen-
sation in the form of "damages" is appropriate."' This was true even
though the majority of the cleanup operations would be performed by
Intel and other PRPs involved at the site. Intel cited several California
cases which, though not precisely on point, supported the court's
reasoning.8s
A California court of appeal, however, disagreed in AIU Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court 3 with Intel's analysis of California law and held
that the term "damages" unambiguously excludes remediation costs
under governmental compulsion.8 " AIU Insurance based its decision
76. See NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 988.
77. Id. at 987.
78. See id.
79. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988). For the earlier discussion of Intel, see supra
notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 1186-87.
81. Id. at 1189. Under California law, groundwater is a public resource, contamina-
tion of which is a tangible injury to a third party, the state. Id. Much of the decision
focused on several exclusions contained in the policy which the insurer was attempting to
enforce. The court agreed that Intel could not recover the portion of costs attributable to
cleanup of its own property. The court determined, however, that segregation of ex-
penses between abatement costs for cleaning up damage to third party interests (which
are recoverable) and those for Intel's property (which are not recoverable) was not as
difficult as the insurer claimed. Basically, the court concluded that any activity required
by governmental agencies was necessary to meet the health and safety mandates of the
relevant states, and therefore was recoverable as remedying damage or potential damage
to the public (i.e., a third party). Id. at 1194.
82. Id. at 1190 (citing Hanson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.
1985); Globe Indem. Co. v. State, 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1974)).
83. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, petition for review granted, - Cal. 3d
782 P.2d 595, 264 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1989).
84. Id. at _, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
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denying coverage for response costs on a "majority of decisions
hold[ing] that liability insurance does not cover the costs of compli-
ance with a mandatory injunction."85 The court relied heavily upon
Armco, noting that the case did not turn on "hypertechnical distinc-
tions between law and equity."8 6 The court explained:
A careful reading of the ARMCO decision reveals that the court there
determined that as a matter of law a liability insurer did not intend to
assume the massive and open ended risk of the costs of the insured's
compliance with mandatory injunctions to remedy toxic pollution con-
ditions. The decision is . . . that insurers never intended to assume
such uncertain and potentially enormous risks. It is clear the decision
is not based on common law formalism or arcane nuances of Maryland
law (which law is barely touched upon in the Armco opinion). It rep-
resents the considered opinion of the court that liability insurance
policies were never intended to foot the bill for the kinds of remedies
CERCLA and like statutes provide.
8 7
The court determined that the Armco holding was consistent with Cal-
ifornia case law denying coverage for the costs of compliance with gov-
ernmental directives. 8
There is little doubt that neither party entered the insurance con-
tract anticipating a claim of this sort; Superfund did not exist at the
time the contract was executed. The parties did contemplate and ex-
pressly agree, however, that the insurer would honor the policy if the
insured became legally obligated to pay damages to a third party be-
cause of property damage. An insured could legitimately expect its in-
surance carrier to pay these damages.8 As a PRP, an insured is legally
obligated to pay the costs associated with the cleanup of uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites. Moreover, this obligation does not arise exclu-
sively from a civil judgment.9 The AIU Insurance court was unim-
pressed with this reasoning, however, and rejected the Intel holding.91
AIU Insurance also rejected another California court of appeal de-
cision, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court,92 which held that re-
sponse costs under CERCLA and similar statutes are covered by a
85, Id. at ., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (citing a number of cases from California and
other jurisdictions).
86, Id. at -, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1190
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (discussing liability to third parties under similar insurance contract).
90. See id.
91. See AIU Ins., 213 Cal. App. 3d at -, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
92. 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, 257 Cal. Rptr. 628, supplemented on denial of rehearing,
211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989).
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CGL policy except for preventive relief.93 The AIU Insurance court
determined Aerojet was distinguishable because it involved allegations
of pollution damage to the state's interest in subsurface and navigable
waters. According to AIU Insurance, coverage for such an injury is
within the plain meaning of the term "damages," whether the ag-
grieved party is a governmental entity or a private individual. The
court stated:
To the extent that the result in Aerojet rests on that court's percep-
tion that the governmental agencies there sought recompense for
damage to proprietary governmental interests in property, we do not
disagree with the decision; but insofar as the decision holds that there
is coverage for the costs of compliance with the police power, we must
respectfully disagree. 5
AIU Insurance, unlike the cases discussed previously, emphasized
that CGL policies do not encompass expenses incurred pursuant to a
governmental exercise of the police power. According to AIU Insur-
ance, the federal government utilizes CERCLA to recover response
costs as a direct exercise of the police power:96 "The government does
not own the affected property; rather it exercises its statutory author-
ity to compel cleanup for the benefit of all the public at large. ' 97 The
court also noted the lack of any precedent requiring insurance coverage
for compliance with such a governmental directive, and the danger of
recognizing coverage in this situation. The court cautioned that "[t]he
broad principle stated in Aerojet could render liability insurers respon-
sible for the costs of doing business, such as mandatory compliance
with a local zoning ordinance."99 While it is doubtful that the court's
fears would be realized if response costs were held to be recoverable
under insurance policies, the "police power" exclusion is more plausi-
ble than the technical equitable relief/legal damages distinction ad-
vanced by so many other courts denying coverage.
The court in AU Insurance combined the rationale of Armco and
its own police power argument to formulate the following three reasons
to deny insurance coverage for response costs under CERCLA: (1) cost
93. Id. at -, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
94. AU Ins., 213 Cal. App. 3d at - 262 Cal. Rptr. at 189. According to the court in
AU Ins., the parties had not presented facts establishing what part, if any, of the in-
jured property was owned by the governmental agencies seeking remediation of the site.
Id.
95. Id. at ., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
96. Id. "The stated purpose of a CERCLA action... is equitable, not to compen-
sate parties for harm, but to facilitate government cleanup to protect the public health."
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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recovery is an exercise of the police power; (2) response costs are resti-
tutionary in nature; and (3) coverage of response costs was not contem-
plated by the parties to the insurance policy.99 The court apparently
viewed these facts as interrelated, as is illustrated by the final holding.
The court reasoned that at the time the parties to the insurance policy
entered the contract, they could not have reasonably expected that the
policy would cover CERCLA response costs, because no precedent ex-
ists for coverage of a governmental exercise of the police power. Conse-
quently, no coverage existed. 00 While certainly there are arguments to
the contrary, the AU Insurance court has utilized a somewhat novel
approach to the growing debate over insurance coverage for Superfund
liabilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the expense of CERCLA cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites continues to rise, the number of PRPs seeking insurance
coverage for those costs also will increase. Currently, the forum in
which the claim is brought is crucial to the determination on cover-
age-a condition which likely will continue to exist until the United
States Supreme Court agrees to accept one of these cases for review.
Until that time, federal court litigants should ask the federal courts to
certify the question of coverage to the appropriate state supreme
court,101 since various federal courts appear to find differing meanings
in the so called "black-letter" insurance law.
99. Id.
100. Id. at -, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
101. See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1989)
(certified question to Georgia Supreme Court concerning how Georgia state law would
construe pollution exclusion clause); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333,
380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (under Georgia law, CGL policy covers property damages caused
by pollution, despite pollution exclusion clause).
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